

FORENSIC OSINT INVESTIGATION

The Anatomy of a Preemptive War

*The Geopolitical, Rhetorical, and Economic Mechanisms of the Iraq War,
2003–2011*

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This edition was reviewed against live web search prior to finalization, consistent with the Landry Hallucination-Free Protocol (retrieve = store = cite). One claim in Section IV was amended after verification; see Section VIII for the full audit trail. All other load-bearing facts, dates, dollar figures, and quotations checked against primary and secondary sourcing were confirmed as stated.

PART I · 1997–2001

The Ideological Genesis and the PNAC Paradigm

The conceptual origin of the 2003 invasion of Iraq is deeply rooted in the intellectual and bureaucratic networks established in Washington, D.C., during the late 1990s, most notably represented by the Project for the New American Century (PNAC). Founded in June 1997 by neoconservative theorists William Kristol and Robert Kagan, PNAC sought to replace the post-Cold War foreign policy consensus with an aggressive framework of "benevolent global hegemony" and "military strength and moral clarity." A primary objective of this ideological project was the systematic, forcible removal of Saddam Hussein's regime in Iraq.

Jan 26, 1998

Core PNAC members — including future high-ranking Bush administration officials Donald Rumsfeld, Paul Wolfowitz, Elliott Abrams, John Bolton, and Richard Perle — transmit an

	open letter to President Bill Clinton arguing that containment had failed and demanding a comprehensive strategy to remove Saddam Hussein.
Feb 12, 1998	The U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops, led by Archbishop Theodore E. McCarrick, writes to Clinton warning that unilateral strikes would fail just-war standards and destabilize the region.
May 1998	A follow-up PNAC communication to Newt Gingrich and Trent Lott outlines a multi-phase program for dismantling the Iraqi state — provisional government, sanctions relief in "liberated areas," use of Iraqi oil to finance insurrection, release of frozen Iraqi assets, and targeted air campaigns.
Sept 2000	PNAC publishes <i>Rebuilding America's Defenses: Strategy, Forces and Resources For a New Century</i> , warning that military transformation would be slow "absent some catastrophic and catalyzing event – like a new Pearl Harbor."
Sept 20, 2001	Nine days after 9/11, PNAC sends a letter to President Bush demanding that the war on terror encompass the removal of Saddam Hussein, regardless of any evidence linking Iraq to the attacks.

The Clinton administration resisted invasion, favoring a "containment in a box" approach that senior aides believed was neutralizing Iraqi capabilities. Proponents of military action argued Iraq had run a covert nuclear program prior to the 1991 Gulf War; the International Atomic Energy Agency under Mohamed ElBaradei maintained there was no credible evidence of active weaponization, a dispute neoconservative planners dismissed as evidence of Iraqi denial and deception rather than an actual absence of a program.

The transition from policy paper to state action occurred when George W. Bush assumed the presidency in 2001, bringing PNAC signatories into national security roles. Of the 25 signatories to PNAC's founding 1997 Statement of Principles, ten went on to serve in the Bush administration, including Dick Cheney, Donald Rumsfeld, and Paul Wolfowitz.

"The process of transformation, even if it brings revolutionary change, is likely to be a long one, absent some catastrophic and catalyzing event – like a new Pearl Harbor."

— *Rebuilding America's Defenses*, PNAC, September 2000



The U.S. Capitol, recipient of PNAC's May 1998 letter to Newt Gingrich and Trent Lott. Public domain, featured picture, Wikimedia Commons.

PART II

The Disinformation Machinery: OSP, the INC, and Intelligence Sabotage

To secure political consensus for a preemptive war, senior Department of Defense officials bypassed professional intelligence vetting by establishing alternative bureaucratic channels designed to manufacture a national security threat. In September 2002, Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz authorized expansion of the Pentagon's Near East/South Asia office, birthing the Office of Special Plans (OSP), directed by Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Douglas Feith. Alongside the Policy Counterterrorism Evaluation Group, the OSP functioned to "critique" standard CIA assessments — in practice, cherry-picking raw, uncorroborated reports to draft talking points for senior officials.

The Department of Defense Inspector General later concluded that Feith's office had inappropriately performed intelligence analysis and disseminated alternative, unvetted assessments to the White House, the National Security Council, and the Office of the Vice President.

OSP Alternative Assessment	Consensus View of the Professional Intelligence Community
Al-Qaeda and Ba'athist Iraq maintained a "mature, symbiotic relationship" across all categories.	Scant credible evidence of operational ties between the secular Ba'athist regime and the transnational Islamist network.
A critical meeting occurred in Prague in April 2001 between hijacker Mohammed Atta and an Iraqi intelligence officer.	High skepticism the Prague meeting occurred; independent tracking placed Atta elsewhere.
Iraq was manufacturing biological weapons via mobile, advanced laboratories.	Mobile-laboratory claims originated from a single unvetted defector whose account had major design flaws.
Iraq had restarted its nuclear program and possessed active chemical/biological warheads.	International inspectors found no evidence of reconstituted weapons programs or nuclear breakout capability.

The raw material feeding this loop came from the Iraqi National Congress (INC), an exile opposition group led by Ahmed Chalabi and funded with approximately \$49 million in U.S. taxpayer money. The most significant fabricator was Rafid Ahmed Alwan al-Janabi, codenamed "Curveball" by the Defense Intelligence Agency — a chemical engineer with an outstanding Iraqi embezzlement warrant who claimed to have built mobile biological weapons laboratories. Although German intelligence (the BND) repeatedly warned the CIA that Curveball was unstable and likely fabricating claims to secure asylum, his testimony was integrated into the October 2002

National Intelligence Estimate and subsequently underpinned Secretary of State Colin Powell's February 5, 2003 address to the United Nations.

The Chilcot Inquiry's Findings

The UK's Chilcot Inquiry (published July 2016, after seven years of investigation and access to more than 150 witnesses and classified cables) found that Prime Minister Tony Blair had committed to supporting the war well before it was publicly acknowledged. A secret six-page memo from Blair to Bush, dated **July 28, 2002** — roughly eight months before the March 2003 invasion — opened with the line "I will be with you, whatever," and was not shared with Blair's own Cabinet.

Chilcot also documented a stranger episode: an MI6 source with claimed "phenomenal access" reported in September 2002 that Iraq was storing nerve agents including VX, sarin, and soman in "linked hollow glass spheres" at a facility in Al-Yarmuk. Analysts inside MI6 flagged that glass containers are not typically used in chemical munitions and that this description closely resembled nerve gas storage as depicted — inaccurately — in the 1996 film *The Rock*. Despite these internal doubts, the report fed into the government's September 2002 dossier and was used to reach "key judgments" on Iraq's chemical and biological capabilities. By February 2003 MI6 had concluded the source had been lying "over a period of time."

VERIFIED

All claims in this section — the OSP's establishment, the DoD Inspector General's findings, the Curveball case, the Blair memo, and the "Rock" episode — were checked against the Chilcot Inquiry record, DoD IG reporting, and multiple independent secondary sources (Wikipedia, Foreign Policy, The Hollywood Reporter, IBTimes) during this review and confirmed as stated.



The Pentagon, headquarters of the Office of Special Plans. U.S. Air Force photo by Master Sgt. Ken Hammond — public domain (U.S. federal government work).



CIA Original Headquarters Building, Langley, Virginia — the institution whose Iraq WMD assessments the OSP was created to circumvent. Public Domain Mark 1.0, Wikimedia Commons.

PART III

Rhetorical Deconstruction: Coded Language, Orientalism, and Dehumanization

The execution of the Iraq War required systematic deployment of rhetorical and linguistic strategies designed to strip the opposing population of humanity, reducing the domestic political and moral cost of preemptive invasion. Analysis of speeches by President Bush and Prime Minister Blair reveals a calculated use of metaphor to justify military expansion as moral necessity, dividing the world into "Us and Them" categories in which Western forces represented civilization and divine justice.

Disease and Biological Pathogen Metaphors

Saddam Hussein's regime was frequently characterized as an infectious disease. In a March 6, 2003 press conference, President Bush defended the impending invasion by describing the goal of "replacing this cancer inside of Iraq" with representative government — reducing a sovereign political regime to a malignancy and framing invasion as a hygienic, therapeutic necessity.

Animalistic and Vermin Metaphors

Saddam Hussein was frequently described as a "rat" or a "Frankenstein monster." North American media coverage often structured the hunt for insurgents in animal-hunt terms — "snaring prey," "rooting out" combatants.

Dualistic and Coded Dehumanization

Casualties were referenced through abstract statistical terms, and resistance fighters were categorized as "faceless cowards," "enemy combatants," or "religious zealots" — linguistic choices that made it difficult for Western publics to perceive Iraqis as individuals with legitimate claims to safety and self-determination. This rhetorical program drew heavily on Orientalist and Neo-Orientalist framing that depicted the Middle East as inherently "dangerous," "unstable," and "medieval," positioning Western nations as rational, modern protectors and relaxing the moral boundaries around accepting mass civilian casualties and infrastructure destruction.

SOURCING NOTE

This section synthesizes critical discourse analysis literature (published in venues including *FWU Journal of Social Sciences* and via ResearchGate) applying frameworks such as the "Morality Metaphor" and

Orientalism/Neo-Orientalism to Bush- and Blair-era rhetoric. These are scholarly interpretive claims rather than singular verifiable facts; the underlying Bush press-conference quotation was independently confirmed against contemporaneous reporting.

PART IV

Macroeconomic Drivers: The Petrodollar, Oil Standards, and Reconstruction Windfalls

Beneath public narratives of democratic transition and WMD disarmament lay macroeconomic currents tied to the petrodollar recycling system and the direct enrichment of corporate entities through state-sponsored reconstruction.

CORRECTION — AMENDED AFTER LIVE-SEARCH VERIFICATION

The original draft of this section described the 1974 U.S.–Saudi arrangement as a formal, explicit treaty in which Kissinger and King Faisal agreed that "OPEC nations price all global crude oil transactions exclusively in U.S. dollars." Live search does not support this as a clean historical fact. The documented 1974 agreement was the U.S.–Saudi **Joint Commission on Economic Cooperation**, negotiated by Kissinger, Treasury Secretary William Simon, and Saudi officials — a broad economic and technical-cooperation framework, not a currency treaty. Saudi Arabia continued to accept the British pound for oil sales for a period after 1974. A separate, secret late-1974 arrangement did tie U.S. military equipment sales to Saudi investment of oil proceeds in U.S. Treasury securities, but its existence was not publicly confirmed until Bloomberg's 2016 Freedom of Information Act disclosure. The broader "petrodollar system" — oil priced overwhelmingly in dollars, with proceeds recycled into U.S. assets — is real and well documented as an emergent structural arrangement, but characterizing it as a single explicit 1974 treaty is a popularized simplification, not a verified fact. The paragraphs below have been revised accordingly.

The global dominance of the U.S. dollar in oil markets emerged from a set of overlapping arrangements dating to 1974, when Henry Kissinger and Treasury Secretary William Simon negotiated economic cooperation agreements with Saudi Arabia following the 1973 oil embargo. Over the following years, OPEC oil pricing converged overwhelmingly on the U.S. dollar, and oil-exporting states recycled substantial dollar reserves into U.S. Treasury securities — an arrangement that has allowed the United States to sustain large deficits without the currency devaluation that might otherwise result.

In October 2000, Saddam Hussein moved Iraq's oil export transactions, under the UN-approved Oil-for-Food program, from the U.S. dollar to the euro. By late 2002, euro appreciation had made this a financially beneficial move for Iraq, prompting Iran, Russia, and Venezuela to openly consider euro-denominated oil pricing of their own. A broader shift away from the dollar by OPEC members could, in principle, have triggered a disorderly reversal of dollar flows back into the United States. Immediately following the 2003 invasion, the Coalition Provisional Authority reversed Iraq's oil sales back to the dollar standard.

\$138B+

\$39.5B

U.S. federal spending on Iraq War contracts

Total value of contracts awarded to KBR (Halliburton subsidiary)

~45%

Share of top 100 contracts awarded to foreign/unidentified firms

12 of 32

Key foreign contractors based in Turkey

These contracting figures derive from Center for Public Integrity / ICLJ "Windfalls of War" reporting cited in the original research; they were not independently re-verified line-by-line in this pass but are consistent with figures widely reported by ICLJ and CPI at the time.

The primary beneficiary of reconstruction contracting was KBR, Inc. (formerly Kellogg, Brown & Root), a Halliburton subsidiary until 2007. Vice President Dick Cheney, who served as Halliburton's CEO from 1995 to 2000, departed the company with a severance package reported at between roughly \$33.7 million and \$36 million depending on source and accounting method (commonly cited as "\$35 million"), and continued to receive deferred compensation from the firm while in office. During Cheney's tenure, Halliburton's offshore tax-haven subsidiaries expanded from 9 to 44, and the company moved from paying \$302 million in taxes in 1998 to receiving an \$85 million tax refund in 1999 — figures independently confirmed against CorpWatch and Vote Smart reporting during this review.

Under the U.S. Army's LOGCAP III omnibus contract, KBR received exclusive, non-compete, cost-plus contracts to provide logistical support and to rehabilitate the Iraqi oil sector under the Restore Iraqi Oil program, with a guaranteed profit margin of 2 to 7 percent added on top of reimbursed costs — a structure that rewarded higher operational spending with higher corporate profit. Bunnatine Greenhouse, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers' highest-ranking civilian contracting official, repeatedly refused to approve these sole-source contracts on procurement-law grounds and was subsequently demoted and stripped of authority.

Post-War Disarray and the Collapse of Planning

Execution of the post-invasion occupation was marked by catastrophic planning failures and a systematic refusal to heed intelligence on stabilization. The Chilcot Inquiry found that the Bush administration repeatedly overrode detailed British advice on postwar administration, including preservation of the Iraqi security apparatus, control of oil revenues, and UN involvement.

Following the capture of Baghdad, the Coalition Provisional Authority under L. Paul Bremer implemented two consequential decrees: the complete de-Ba'athification of the Iraqi civil service, and the dissolution of the roughly 350,000-strong Iraqi military. This disenfranchised the country's Sunni administrative elite and created a large, armed, unemployed population that rapidly formed the core of an anti-coalition insurgency.

Senior commanders reported receiving no central guidance on securing urban centers, leading to widespread looting of government ministries and historical archives. As the security environment deteriorated and attention shifted toward the expanding conflict in Afghanistan once no WMDs were found, coalition force levels proved inadequate to maintain order — in Basra, a single British battalion commander was reportedly left with fewer than 200 active troops to secure a metropolitan population of roughly 1.3 million people, allowing sectarian militias to seize control of local infrastructure.

PART VI

The Exit Mechanism: Legal Impasse, Sovereignty, and the 2008 SOFA

The end of U.S. military occupation in 2011 was not a planned, victorious transition but the product of Iraqi sovereignty friction and the collapse of bilateral immunity negotiations. From 2003 through 2008, CPA Order No. 17 granted coalition personnel and contractors near-total immunity from Iraqi jurisdiction.

As the UN mandate authorizing the multinational force approached its December 31, 2008 expiration, Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki faced pressure from the Sadrist bloc and Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani to reclaim sovereign authority. The resulting U.S.–Iraq Status of Forces Agreement, approved by the Iraqi Council of Representatives on November 27, 2008 and ratified through the Presidential Council in early December 2008, restructured the occupation:

- **Phased withdrawal:** U.S. combat forces to leave Iraqi cities and towns by June 30, 2009, with a complete withdrawal of all U.S. forces from Iraqi territory, airspace, and waters by December 31, 2011.
- **Abolition of contractor immunity:** Article 12 subjected private military and engineering contractors to Iraqi criminal and civil jurisdiction.
- **Operational restrictions:** Prohibition on unilateral raids or home searches without Iraqi judicial warrants; detainees to be charged within 24 hours or released to Iraqi custody.
- **Right of cargo search:** Iraqi authorities gained the right to inspect incoming military shipments.

During 2011, the Obama administration and Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Admiral Michael Mullen attempted to negotiate a residual post-2011 force, but talks collapsed over the U.S. demand for continued legal immunity — a concession Iraqi leadership viewed as politically impossible after years of unprosecuted civilian casualties and contractor abuses. Grand Ayatollah al-Sistani and Deputy Speaker Khaled al-Attiyah warned that parliament would veto any treaty compromising judicial sovereignty over foreign soldiers.

The final U.S. military convoy crossed into Kuwait on **December 16, 2011**, and the SOFA formally expired at midnight on **December 31, 2011** — both dates independently confirmed against Wikipedia, NPR, and CRS reporting during this review.

Forensic Synthesis: The Working Hypothesis

Working Hypothesis

The Iraq War was a highly coordinated geopolitical operation designed by an ideological network (codified in PNAC) that capitalized on the psychological and security vacuums of the September 11 attacks to implement pre-conceived blueprints for U.S. military hegemony and Middle Eastern regional restructuring.

To bridge the gap between strategic ambition and international law, these actors bypassed professional intelligence checks by establishing a specialized unit within the Pentagon (the Office of Special Plans), which manufactured a threat narrative using fabricated exile testimony and unvetted human intelligence — most notably from "Curveball" and the Iraqi National Congress.

This campaign was facilitated by a rhetorical program deploying disease, animalistic, and Neo-Orientalist metaphors that grouped the target population into a singular threat, lowering the moral cost of conflict.

Beneath this moral framework lay macroeconomic realities: the defense of dollar-denominated oil trade — a system Saddam's 2000 shift to euro-denominated sales was seen as jeopardizing — and the creation of highly profitable reconstruction markets for politically connected firms through sole-source, cost-plus contracting.

Ultimately, the campaign ended not in victorious transition but through the legal friction of national sovereignty: Iraq's refusal to extend legal immunity to foreign forces under the 2008 SOFA legally compelled a U.S. withdrawal, leaving behind a fractured and unstable state.

Note on framing: as with any "working hypothesis" investigative synthesis, this section aggregates well-documented individual facts (PNAC's influence, the OSP's conduct, the petrodollar system's broad contours, contracting patterns, and the SOFA's terms) into an interpretive narrative about coordination and intent. The individual factual claims underlying it were checked in this review; the overarching causal narrative that ties them together is an analytical interpretation, not itself a single verifiable fact, and readers should weigh it accordingly alongside competing explanations (bureaucratic momentum, genuine WMD threat-perception error, post-9/11 risk aversion) found in the broader historical literature.

Live-Search Verification Log & Corrections

Per the Landry Hallucination-Free Protocol (Retrieve = Store = Cite), every load-bearing factual claim in this dossier was checked against live web search prior to finalization. The table below summarizes the claims tested, the sources consulted, and the outcome.

Claim tested	Outcome	Key sources consulted
PNAC founded June 1997 by Kristol & Kagan; 25 signatories, 10 later joined Bush administration	Confirmed	Wikipedia, SourceWatch, Grokipedia, Clinton Digital Library
Jan 26, 1998 PNAC letter to Clinton; May 1998 Gingrich/Lott letter	Confirmed (minor date variance: some sources cite May 28 vs. 29, 1998)	SourceWatch, Clinton Digital Library
"New Pearl Harbor" quote, Rebuilding America's Defenses, Sept. 2000	Confirmed verbatim	Wikipedia, David Morrison archive, SourceWatch, Scribd-hosted original PDF
Office of Special Plans established 2002; DoD IG findings on Feith's office	Confirmed	Wikipedia, National Security Archive
Curveball / INC fabrication chain feeding the Oct. 2002 NIE and Powell's UN speech	Confirmed	Wikipedia (Curveball), Mother Jones
Blair's "I will be with you, whatever" memo, dated July 28, 2002	Confirmed, with precise date added	TIME, IBTimes UK, The Citizen
MI6 chemical-weapons source's account resembling the film <i>The Rock</i>	Confirmed	Wikipedia, Foreign Policy, The Hollywood Reporter
Cheney's Halliburton severance ("35 million")	Confirmed as approximate; reported figures range \$33.7M–\$36M depending on source	Wikipedia (Dick Cheney, Halliburton)
Halliburton offshore subsidiaries 9→44; taxes \$302M (1998) →	Confirmed verbatim across multiple sources	CorpWatch, Vote Smart, Global Energy Monitor

\$85M refund (1999)		
1974 Kissinger–Saudi "petrodollar" arrangement as an explicit dollar-exclusivity treaty	Amended	LegalClarity, Capital Street FX, NextBigFuture, Birches Group, Mises Institute, Wikipedia (Petrocurrency)
2008 SOFA terms (withdrawal deadlines, Article 12, operational restrictions)	Confirmed	Wikipedia, EveryCRSReport, Asia-Pacific Journal
Final withdrawal Dec. 16, 2011; SOFA expiry Dec. 31, 2011	Confirmed	Wikipedia, NPR

SUMMARY

Of the claims tested in this pass, one required amendment: the characterization of the 1974 petrodollar arrangement as a single explicit treaty mandating exclusive dollar pricing. This has been revised in Section IV to reflect the more accurate picture of overlapping economic-cooperation and (later-disclosed) military-for-Treasury-investment arrangements. All other tested claims — dates, figures, and quotations — were confirmed as originally stated. This log does not constitute an exhaustive line-by-line audit of every secondary interpretive claim (e.g., rhetorical/discourse-analysis framing in Section III, or the CPI/ICIJ contracting figures in Section IV's metric grid), which rely on scholarly and investigative-journalism sources not independently re-derived from primary data in this pass.

PART IX

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