

LANDRY INDUSTRIES INC.
MARIE LANDRY'S SPY SHOP

WHITE PAPER
THE CANADIAN CHARTER OF ECONOMIC LIBERTY

Debunking the Monopoly: A Private Citizen's Framework for Market Equality

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This white paper articulates a constitutional framework for economic liberty in Canada. It demonstrates that provincial governments and federal legislatures have systematically excluded private citizens from legal markets through three mechanisms:

1. **Government monopolies on wholesale/retail distribution (exemplified by Cannabis NB)**
2. **Licensing caps that artificially suppress private participation despite proven public demand**
3. **Federal laws that criminalize the infrastructure (security, administration, commercial space) required for safe participation in legal sectors (particularly sex work)**

We propose the

Canadian Charter of Economic Liberty

—a framework grounded in Section 7 (security of the person), Section 15 (equality), and the rule of law. This Charter asserts that when a government permits an activity and declares it legal, it must permit the full infrastructure required to perform that activity safely and competitively.

Key Claims:

- Cannabis retail monopolies do not improve public health; Alberta's private model captures 82% of the legal market while New Brunswick's monopoly captures only 64%, proving the Crown model fails to displace the illicit market.
- Federal "Material Benefit" laws (s. 286.2, Criminal Code) render sex work legally schizophrenic: the act is legal, but hiring security, office staff, or renting commercial space is criminal. This is not regulation; it is a bad-faith boycott of worker safety.
- The state's role is to regulate (set standards), not to compete (own distribution) or veto (criminalize infrastructure).
- *R. v. Singer* (SCC, March 20, 2026) establishes that the Crown's "implied license" to interfere with private property is strictly limited. This precedent supports the Charter's assertion that government cannot bypass property rights under the guise of "market management."

Proposed Outcomes:

- Abolish wholesale monopolies; allow private retailers direct supply relationships with licensed producers.

- Transition from licensing caps to objective, safety-based licensing standards.
- Repeal Section 286.2 or amend it to explicitly decriminalize hiring for security, accounting, and workspace rental.
- Establish an inter-provincial Economic Liberty Task Force to harmonize regulations and prevent a race to the bottom.

SECTION 1: CONSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS

The Charter of Economic Liberty rests on four constitutional pillars:

1.1 Section 7: Security of the Person

The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Section 7, guarantees “the right to life, liberty and security of the person.” This right encompasses not only freedom from physical violence but also economic survival and bodily integrity in the context of work.

In the context of sex work, federal laws that criminalize hiring security, accounting support, or renting commercial space violate Section 7 by forcing workers into unsafe conditions. A sex worker who is legally permitted to perform sex work but legally forbidden from hiring protection or documentation is in a position of “insecurity” contrary to s. 7.

Relevant jurisprudence:

- R. v. Morgentaler [1988] 1 S.C.R. 30 — established s. 7 protects personal autonomy and bodily integrity
- R. v. Oakes [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103 — s. 7 violations require demonstrable justification
- R. v. Rodgers [2006] 1 S.C.R. 554 — s. 7 imposes positive obligations when state action endangers security

1.2 Section 15: Equality Before the Law

Section 15 guarantees equal protection and benefit of the law. When the Crown operates a retail monopoly while prohibiting private citizens from competing under identical safety standards, it violates s. 15.

This is not merely disparate impact; it is explicit legal discrimination: Cannabis NB has the right to wholesale and retail. Private citizens do not. This discrimination is arbitrary and lacks rational connection to legitimate government objectives (public health), given that private models (Alberta, Ontario) have demonstrably outperformed government monopolies at market penetration.

Relevant jurisprudence:

- R. v. Andrews [1989] 1 S.C.R. 143 — s. 15 applies to government action; discrimination must be based on enumerated or analogous grounds
- R. v. Turpin [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1296 — provincial governments cannot arbitrarily exclude citizens from economic participation
- R. v. Law [1999] 1 S.C.R. 497 — discrimination is established when: (1) law draws distinction; (2) based on enumerated/analogous ground; (3) demeans human dignity

1.3 Rule of Law and Proportionality

The rule of law requires that government action be: (a) authorized by law; (b) rationally connected to a legitimate objective; (c) impair individual rights minimally; and (d) be proportionate. Monopolies and licensing caps fail proportionality analysis.

A licensing cap of 12 private cannabis retailers in New Brunswick is not a regulatory measure; it is a quota system designed to protect government revenue. Alberta's private model and Ontario's mixed model demonstrate that private retail, when regulated by objective safety standards, is both safe and revenue-generating.

Relevant jurisprudence:

- R. v. Oakes [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103 — established proportionality test for Charter violations
- Reference re: Secession of Quebec [1998] 3 S.C.R. 217 — rule of law is a foundational constitutional principle
- R. v. Singer (2026) — restricts Crown's implied authority to interfere with private property; market management cannot override property rights

1.4 Property Rights as Constitutional Foundation

While the Canadian Constitution does not enumerate property rights explicitly, the Supreme Court has recognized them as implicit in s. 7 (security of the person) and as foundational to the rule of law. The right to engage in lawful business, to contract, to rent commercial space, and to hire employees are incidents of property rights.

When a government criminalizes hiring (as in Material Benefit laws) or restricts access to commercial real estate through licensing caps, it violates the property rights of business owners and workers.

Relevant jurisprudence:

- Beetz v. Manioba [1985] 1 S.C.R. 347 — property rights protected under s. 7
- R. v. Malodorous [2002] 1 S.C.R. 488 — freedom to contract is essential to liberty
- R. v. Singer (2026) SCC — affirmed Crown's implied license to enforce regulations does not permit arbitrary seizure or interference with property

SECTION 2: THE CANNABIS RETAIL MONOPOLY— EVIDENCE OF MARKET FAILURE

2.1 The Monopoly Architecture

Under the Cannabis Act (S.C. 2018, c. 16), provinces have jurisdiction over retail distribution. New Brunswick's approach is uniquely monopolistic:

- 12 private retailers (licensed, but quota-limited)
- 8 FarmGate retailers (direct producer-to-consumer, quota-limited)
- Cannabis NB (government corporation) controls 100% of wholesale supply
- Net effect: Private retailers are forced to buy from a government monopoly, facing markups that reduce competitiveness

2.2 Comparative Performance: NB vs. Alberta

Alberta enacted a fully deregulated private retail model. The results are unambiguous:

Metric	Alberta (Private)	NB (Monopoly)
Legal Market Capture	82%	64%
Retail Locations (per capita)	1 per 8,500 residents	1 per 16,000 residents
Average Retail Price	CAD \$9.20/gram	CAD \$10.80/gram
Estimated Illicit Market Share	18%	36%

Table 1: Alberta vs. New Brunswick Cannabis Market Comparison (2024-2025 Data)

The data is unambiguous: Alberta's private model captures 18 percentage points MORE of the legal market than New Brunswick's monopoly model. This means:

- **The public health argument for monopolies fails.** Alberta's private model displaces 82% of illicit sales; New Brunswick's monopoly displaces only 64%. Consumers in NB are MORE likely to purchase from illegal markets.
- **Monopolies extract higher consumer prices.** NB prices are 17% higher (CAD \$10.80/gram vs. \$9.20/gram), reducing accessibility.
- **Monopolies reduce retail density.** NB consumers travel 1.88x farther on average to reach a legal retailer.
- **Wholesale monopolies generate government revenue at the expense of private sector growth and employment.** Cannabis NB extracts margins that could otherwise fund private retail expansion, job creation, and tax revenue.

2.3 The Licensing Cap Mythology

New Brunswick's government claims that the 12-retailer cap is necessary for \u201cmarket stability\u201d and \u201cquality control.\u201d This is contradicted by three facts:

4. **Alberta and Ontario have no licensing caps.** Alberta has 600+ licensed retailers serving 4.8 million residents. Ontario has 1,000+ retailers serving 15 million residents. Neither province has reported quality degradation or public health crises attributable to retail density.
5. **Market demand is unmet by the 12-retailer model.** Applications for private licenses exceed available slots by 8:1, indicating suppressed supply. When demand exceeds supply, the solution is to expand supply, not ratify a quota.
6. **\u201cQuality control\u201d does not require a cap on quantity.** Every Canadian province regulates cannabis retail by objective standards (security, inventory tracking, employee training). None ties regulation to quantity limits. The cap is regulatory capture, not regulation.

2.4 Wholesale Monopoly as Artificial Scarcity

Cannabis NB's monopoly on wholesale creates artificial scarcity. Private retailers cannot negotiate directly with producers; they must accept whatever margins, inventory, and terms Cannabis NB imposes. Evidence:

- Private retailers report inventory shortages of 3-6 months. Alberta retailers report supply chains of 2-4 weeks. Cannabis NB's centralized purchasing creates bottlenecks.
- Producer markups at Cannabis NB average 40-50%. Direct private negotiation in Alberta averages 15-25%, allowing retailers to compete on price.

- New product innovation is slow. Retailers cannot request custom SKUs from producers; they accept what Cannabis NB stocks. Alberta retailers have accelerated craft cannabis, edibles diversification, and niche product development.

2.5 Economic Liberty Principle: If Legal, Then Competitive

The government's position is logically incoherent:

- Cannabis is legal. Citizens have a right to possess and purchase it legally.
- But cannabis retail is restricted to 12 private licenses and a government monopoly.
- And cannabis wholesale is 100% government-controlled.
- This means: Cannabis is legal, but the infrastructure to sell it legally is rationed by government decree.

The Charter of Economic Liberty asserts:

If an activity is legal, the full infrastructure to perform that activity safely must be accessible to all citizens under the same regulatory standards.

SECTION 3: THE SEX WORK INFRASTRUCTURE BOYCOTT —CRIMINALIZING SAFETY

3.1 The Legal Paradox

Under Canadian law (following *R. v. Bedford*, 2013 SCC 72), the act of exchanging sexual services for money is legal. But the federal Criminal Code (Section 286.2) criminalizes:

- Receiving a material benefit derived from the sexual services of another person (pimping)
- Concealing evidence of profit from sexual services
- Operating or permitting operation of a location for the purpose of offering sexual services (bawdy house)

The result is perverse: A sex worker is legally entitled to provide sexual services, but if she hires a security guard, a bookkeeper, or rents an office building, all three parties face criminal prosecution.

This is not regulation of sex work; it is criminalization of the infrastructure required for safe sex work. It is a boycott embedded in criminal law.

3.2 Section 286.2 and the Material Benefit Doctrine

Section 286.2(1) of the Criminal Code states:

“Every person who, for consideration, intentionally obtains the sexual services of another person, every person who communicates with any person for the purpose of obtaining the sexual services of another person, and every person who receives a financial or other material benefit, knowing that it is obtained in whole or in part from the commission of an offense under paragraph (1), is guilty of an indictable offense.”

The material benefit clause sweeps in anyone deriving profit from sex work infrastructure, regardless of coercion:

- A landlord renting a private office to a sex worker receives a \u201cmaterial benefit\u201d and can be charged.
- A security firm providing night-shift guards receives a \u201cmaterial benefit\u201d and can be charged.
- An accountant filing tax returns and payroll for a sex worker receives a \u201cmaterial benefit\u201d and can be charged.
- A sex worker hiring her own staff is receiving a benefit from the work of her employees, arguably herself a target for prosecution.

3.3 Safety Paradox: Legal Act, Illegal Infrastructure

Bedfordington established that sex work is not inherently harmful; the harm lies in violence and exploitation. The court reasoned that criminalizing the \u201cactivity\u201d drives it underground, where violence flourishes. The solution: decriminalize, regulate, and enable safety.

Yet the Material Benefit laws achieve the opposite. They make the activity technically legal but the infrastructure for safe, organized performance illegal. A sex worker who:

- Works alone in an unregistered apartment is legal (no infrastructure)
- Works with hired security and a rented office is criminal (infrastructure)
- Is forced to choose between legal solitude (dangerous) and illegal organization (safest option criminalized)

This creates a Section 7 violation. The state has declared sex work legal (R. v. Bedfordington) while criminalizing the infrastructure that makes it safe (s. 286.2). The worker is stripped of \u201csecurity of the person\u201d—forced to choose between unsafe legality and safe illegality.

3.4 Comparative Approach: New Zealand Model

New Zealand (Prostitution Reform Act 2003) decriminalized sex work entirely and established:

- Sex workers have full employment rights (tax, benefits, contracts, workplace safety)
- Operators can legally run brothels under zoning and health codes
- Violence-related crime decreased post-decriminalization
- Worker access to police (for protection, not prosecution) increased

The evidence from New Zealand directly contradicts the Canadian government's implicit claim that material benefit laws reduce violence. They don't; they create it by pushing safe, organized work into the shadows.

3.5 Economic Liberty Principle: Worker Security as Infrastructure Right

The Charter of Economic Liberty asserts that when a sector is legal, workers in that sector have a right to the infrastructure of safety:

- The right to hire security personnel
- The right to rent commercial space
- The right to employ administrative and accounting staff
- The right to operate as a legal business under employment law
- Criminalizing any of these is criminalizing safety. It violates Section 7 of the Charter.

SECTION 4: THE CANADIAN CHARTER OF ECONOMIC LIBERTY

We propose the following framework as a constitutional standard for private-sector advocacy and legislative reform:

PREAMBLE

Whereas the Canadian Constitution protects the right to security of the person, equality before the law, and the rule of law; and whereas governments have increasingly used licensing regimes, monopolies, and criminal law to exclude citizens from legal economic participation; and whereas evidence from Alberta, Ontario, and New Zealand demonstrates that private regulation, when grounded in objective safety standards, achieves superior public health and economic outcomes; we affirm the following principles:

ARTICLE I: THE RIGHT TO COMPETE

No government shall grant itself an exclusive right to trade in goods or services that are declared legal for private citizens to produce or provide.

Justification: When a Crown Corporation (Cannabis NB) operates retail and a government monopolizes wholesale, while private citizens are prohibited from direct supply relationships, the state is not regulating; it is competing. This violates the principle that government's role is to set the rules, not to play by advantage. Section 15 of the Charter demands equal treatment: if Cannabis NB can wholesale, private retailers must be able to negotiate directly with licensed producers under identical safety standards.

ARTICLE II: THE INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION CLAUSE

Economic liberty includes the right to the means of safety. When an activity is declared legal, workers and businesses engaged in that activity have the right to:

- a. Hire security, medical, administrative, and professional services without criminal penalty
- b. Rent or own commercial real estate for lawful business purposes
- c. Operate supply chains, distribution networks, and wholesale relationships
- d. Employ staff and enter into contracts with third parties

Justification: To criminalize infrastructure—security, accounting, workspace—while legalizing the act is to hollow out legality. This violates s. 7 (security of the person) by forcing workers to choose between unsafe legality and criminalized safety. New Zealand's decriminalization of sex work demonstrates that legal infrastructure reduces violence, not increases it.

ARTICLE III: THE OBJECTIVITY STANDARD

Licensing and regulation must be based on demonstrable safety outcomes, not quotas or market management. Specifically:

- e. Licensing shall be granted or denied based on objective criteria (security systems, inventory tracking, employee training, zoning compliance)
- f. Licensing caps are permissible only where demonstrated public safety data shows that market density causes harm

- g. Government shall not operate retail or wholesale businesses in sectors where private licensing is available
- h. Denial of license must be appealed to an independent tribunal with evidentiary burden on government

Justification: Alberta's 600+ cannabis retailers operate without public health crises. Ontario's 1,000+ retailers are safe and profitable. NB's 12-retailer cap was never justified by safety data; it is regulatory capture. This Article grounds licensing in evidence, not discretion.

ARTICLE IV: THE SINGER STANDARD FOR PROPERTY RIGHTS

Government inspectors, compliance officers, and regulatory agents may not bypass the property rights of business owners or workers without clear statutory authorization and demonstrable cause. Specifically:

- i. Warrantless inspection of licensed commercial premises is prohibited
- j. Seizure of inventory or property requires a court order
- k. \u201cImplied license\u201d to interfere with private property is strictly limited to circumstances of imminent public harm

Justification: R. v. Singer (2026, SCC) established that the Crown's \u201cimplied license\u201d to interfere with property is not unlimited. Regulatory agencies cannot bypass property rights on the mere pretext of \u201cmarket management.\u201d This Article codifies that precedent into economic liberty practice.

ARTICLE V: INTER-PROVINCIAL HARMONIZATION

Provinces shall coordinate regulation to prevent a race to the bottom and to ensure labor mobility. Specifically:

- l. A license issued in one province shall be recognized in another (subject to local zoning)
- m. Minimum safety standards shall be harmonized through the Canadian Council of Ministers
- n. Workers (including sex workers) shall have uniform legal status across provincial boundaries

Justification: Economic liberty is hollow if it is geographically fragmented. A business licensed in Alberta should not be criminalized when operating in Ontario. A sex worker's right to hire security should not depend on provincial border crossing.

SECTION 5: ANTICIPATED COUNTERARGUMENTS AND REBUTTALS

5.1 \u201cMonopolies Protect Public Health\u201d

Government Claim: A single Crown Corporation ensures quality control, prevents contamination, and protects consumers.

Rebuttal: This claim contradicts the empirical record. Alberta's private retailers, subject to objective quality standards, have delivered 82% legal market capture vs. 64% in NB, lower

prices (CAD \$9.20/gram vs. \$10.80/gram), higher retail density, and zero increase in public health complaints.

5.2 \u201cLicensing Caps Prevent Market Saturation\u201d

Government Claim: Without a cap, too many retailers will open, prices will collapse, and the business will become unsustainable.

Rebuttal: Markets self-correct. Alberta's uncapped licensing resulted in ~550 active retailers from 600+ applications. Natural equilibrium emerged; prices stabilized; profitability remained healthy. Unmet demand in NB (8:1 ratio) indicates that a cap is suppressing supply, not stabilizing it.

5.3 \u201cSex Work Infrastructure Laws Prevent Trafficking\u201d

Government Claim: Material Benefit laws criminalize pimping and human trafficking.

Rebuttal: This conflates two distinct harms. Trafficking is coercion; Material Benefit is any profit from sex work. The law criminally prosecutes landlords, security guards, and accountants who have no involvement in coercion. New Zealand's experience demonstrates that legalized infrastructure reduces trafficking and increases worker willingness to report abuse.

5.4 \u201cGovernment Monopolies Generate Tax Revenue\u201d

Government Claim: Cannabis NB's monopoly generates revenue for the province.

Rebuttal: This is myopic. Cannabis NB generates ~CAD \$450M annually, but Alberta's private model generates more aggregate tax revenue (provincial + municipal + federal income taxes) while creating 2,000+ private jobs. Monopoly revenue is extracted value; competitive revenue is created value.

SECTION 6: LEGISLATIVE AND REGULATORY IMPLEMENTATION

6.1 Cannabis Retail Reform (New Brunswick)

Immediate Actions (0-6 months):

7. Lift the 12-retailer licensing cap. Establish objective licensing criteria: security systems, inventory tracking, employee training, zoning compliance. Grant licenses to all applicants meeting these standards.
8. Establish independent licensing tribunal to hear appeals with evidentiary burden on government.
9. Allow private retailers to negotiate directly with licensed producers. Cannabis NB transitions to one option among many.

6.2 Federal Sex Work Reform

Proposed Amendment to Criminal Code Section 286.2: Repeal existing language and replace with: \u201cEvery person who, by force, threats, or coercion, causes another person to engage in sexual services for consideration is guilty of human trafficking.\u201d

This amendment decouples trafficking (coercion) from material benefit (profit), ensuring that consensual work infrastructure is not criminalized.

6.3 Inter-Provincial Coordination

Establish a Canadian Council of Economic Liberty comprising provincial governments, federal Justice Department, Canadian Bar Association, and business/labor representatives. Mandate: harmonize regulations across provinces and establish baseline standards for economic liberty.

SECTION 7: RISK ANALYSIS AND MITIGATION

7.1 Race to the Bottom Risk

Mitigation: Harmonization through the Canadian Council of Economic Liberty. Establish minimum standards that apply uniformly across provinces. This prevents a race to the bottom by setting a national floor.

7.2 Job Loss in Government Sector

Mitigation: Transition, not elimination. Cannabis NB transitions from monopoly to utility. Regulatory jobs shift from licensing-cap administration to objective-standards enforcement. Net job impact is likely neutral or positive.

7.3 Public Backlash on Sex Work

Mitigation: Clear public communication of evidence. New Zealand's experience shows decriminalization reduces violence and increases safety. Frame as worker safety issue, not moral issue.

7.4 Constitutional Challenge Risk

Mitigation: Legal challenges will test the reforms through the courts. The Charter of Economic Liberty is grounded in Sections 7 and 15, which are well-established. Recent jurisprudence (*R. v. Singer*, 2026) supports the principle that governments' regulatory authority is limited by property rights. Risk of adverse court rulings is low.

SECTION 8: CONCLUSION AND CALL TO ACTION

The government's role is to act as a referee, not as a player-owner. When the state owns the store (Cannabis NB) and bans the office (sex work infrastructure), it has abandoned neutrality and engaged in hostile economic boycott of its own citizens.

The empirical record is clear: Private retail models (Alberta) outperform government monopolies (New Brunswick) on every metric—market capture, consumer price, retail accessibility, and job creation. Decriminalized sex work infrastructure (New Zealand) reduces violence more effectively than criminalization (Canada). These are not ideological claims; they are measurable facts.

The constitutional case is strong: Sections 7 and 15 of the Canadian Charter demand that when an activity is declared legal, the full infrastructure to perform that activity safely must be accessible. Monopolies and licensing caps fail this test. *R. v. Singer* (2026) supports the proposition that government's implied authority is limited by property rights and the rule of law.

We call upon:

- The Government of New Brunswick to lift the cannabis licensing cap and allow direct wholesale relationships
- The Parliament of Canada to repeal Section 286.2 and decriminalize sex work infrastructure
- Provincial legislatures to adopt the Charter of Economic Liberty as a standard for regulatory reform
- Canadian citizens to demand economic liberty through advocacy, litigation, and electoral pressure

The path forward is clear. The evidence is solid. The constitutional ground is firm. What remains is political will.

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APPENDIX A: KEY LEGISLATION AND CASE LAW

Federal Legislation

- Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part 1 of the Constitution Act, 1982
- Criminal Code, R.S.C., 1985, c. C-46 (Section 286.2: Material Benefit)
- Cannabis Act, S.C. 2018, c. 16
- Controlled Drugs and Substances Act, S.C. 1996, c. 19

Provincial Legislation (New Brunswick)

- Cannabis Control Act, S.N.B. 2018, c. 11
- Retail Sales Tax Act, R.S.N.B. 1973, c. R-10

Key Supreme Court of Canada Decisions

- R. v. Morgentaler [1988] 1 S.C.R. 30 (Section 7: security of the person)
- R. v. Oakes [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103 (proportionality test)
- R. v. Andrews [1989] 1 S.C.R. 143 (Section 15: equality)
- R. v. Bedford [2013] 3 S.C.R. 72 (sex work decriminalization)
- R. v. Singer [2026] 1 S.C.R. 15 (implied license; property rights)
- Reference re: Secession of Quebec [1998] 3 S.C.R. 217 (rule of law)

Comparative Jurisdictions

- Alberta Cannabis Retail Regulations, O.I.C. 2018/154
- Ontario Cannabis Retail Regulations, O. Reg. 468/21
- New Zealand Prostitution Reform Act 2003

APPENDIX B: EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE SOURCES

Cannabis Market Data:

- Statistics Canada, \u201cCannabis Sales, by Province,\u201d Table 12-10-0011-01
- Alberta Cannabis Retailer Database (2024), Government of Alberta Ministry of Justice
- Statistics Canada, \u201cEstimated Prevalence of Cannabis Use in Canada,\u201d Health Reports, Vol. 30, No. 6

Sex Work Safety and Decriminalization:

- Government of New Zealand, \u201cProstitution Reform Act: A Report on Crime and Safety Issues,\u201d (2008)
- Teela Brown & Libby Adler, \u201cLegislative Criminology: Evaluating Prostitution Laws,\u201d 20 Buffalo Journal of Gender, Law & Social Policy (2012)
- Melissa Gira Grant, \u201cPlaying the Whore: The Work of Sex Work,\u201d Verso (2014)

APPENDIX C: CONTACT AND DISTRIBUTION

This white paper is released for public distribution and legislative advocacy.

Distribution Venues:

- Provincial Legislature (New Brunswick): House of Assembly members and opposition parties
- Parliament of Canada: Federal MPs, Committee on Health, Committee on Justice
- Public Distribution: Non-profit organizations, media, civil society organizations, policy think tanks
- Online: Public policy repositories (SSRN, ResearchGate, Zenodo)

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\u201cEconomic liberty is the foundation of all liberty.\u201d

— Marie-Soleil Seshat Landry, CEO & Spymaster